

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**"IF YOU NEED A FRIEND YOU HAVE ONE."
REESTABLISHING MILITARY TRAINING EXERCISES
BETWEEN THE U.S. AND NEW ZEALAND**

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ABSTRACT

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On the sea wall at Aotea Quay in Wellington, New Zealand, a plaque still stands, inscribed with the words "If You Need a Friend You Have One." Members of the U.S. Second Marine Division placed the plaque there when they arrived in New Zealand in 1942. Close ties have existed between the United States and New Zealand since those dark days of World War II. While the dispute over the ANZUS Treaty in the 1980's was a disappointing period for both countries, more recently, and especially since the attacks on the United States in September 2001, U.S. New Zealand relations have become closer. New Zealand has dispatched forces to assist the United States in the Global War on Terrorism, and has contributed forces to stability and relief operations in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. As the United States looks to the future of the U.S. - New Zealand security relationship, it is time for the U.S. to abandon its ban on military exercises with the New Zealand Defense Force, and to restore bilateral and multilateral exercises with New Zealand. This ban has been in effect since 1986, when, in response to New Zealand's anti-nuclear legislation, the U.S. suspended the New Zealand portion of the ANZUS Treaty. In addition, the U.S. placed numerous restrictions on U.S. - New Zealand military relations. Subsequent to the events of 1984-1986, many aspects of the U.S. - New Zealand military relationship have resumed. New Zealand buys U.S. military hardware, trains soldiers in U.S. military schools, and participates in U.S. hosted seminars and meetings. Most importantly, New Zealand Defense Forces serve alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan and in the Arabian Sea. The U.S. and New Zealand are now in a period when our common interests are converging, and the U.S. must restore military exercises with New Zealand to allow New Zealand to fully participate in the Global War on Terrorism and other areas of common interest. While a full restitution of the provisions of the ANZUS Treaty must wait for some action on the part of the New Zealand Government, the U.S. can restore military exercises now, as like minded nations work together to accomplish common objectives.

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"IF YOU NEED A FRIEND YOU HAVE ONE." REESTABLISHING MILITARY TRAINING EXERCISES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND NEW ZEALAND

For the United States to succeed in the Global War on Terrorism, the U.S. must have the ability to act across the face of the planet, at points that the U.S. chooses, when and where the U.S. deems necessary. This fact implies that the United States will rely on the good will of friends and allies¹, on the agreements explicit in treaties, and even on unilateral action to set the conditions for success. In the interests of harmony in the civilized world, for actions by mutual consent and for common purpose are often less costly than actions in war, the U.S. seeks to work with friends and allies when possible. Indeed, President George Bush clearly states in the National Security Strategy of the United States "while our focus is protecting America, we know that to defeat terrorism in today's globalized world we need support from our allies and friends. Wherever possible, the United States will rely on regional organizations and state powers to meet their obligations to fight terrorism."² In the uncertain days of the U.S. led entry into Afghanistan, many traditional friends and allies joined the United States, including Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand. President Bush noted the contributions of New Zealand in Afghanistan when he commented that the United States has "received invaluable assistance from close friends like ... New Zealand."³

If the U.S. national interest in the instance of the Global War on Terrorism is the security of the United States, then the objective (end) is to succeed in the Global War on Terrorism. As noted in the first paragraph, President Bush identifies cooperation with friends and allies as an important concept (way) in this effort. In the case of New Zealand, the means to achieve cooperation puts two U.S. policies in conflict. While the U.S. seeks to work with New Zealand as a friend in the Global War on Terrorism, the U.S. has a policy towards New Zealand that prohibits direct bilateral exercises and multilateral exercises where New Zealand is a participant. The Global War on Terrorism is one in which the challenges are great, and resources must be carefully applied to maximum effect. The United States must address inconsistencies in U.S. policies which weaken the over all effort in the War on Terrorism. Specifically, the U.S. must work with New Zealand to resolve the current policy that prohibits military exercises with New Zealand, and thereby set the conditions where New Zealand's continued military contributions in the Global War on Terrorism, and in other areas of common U.S. and New Zealand interest, are most effective.

BACKGROUND: CONTROVERSY IN THE 1980'S AND THE IMPACT ON THE ANZUS TREATY

One finds the nexus of the policy conflict between the U.S. and New Zealand in New Zealand's policy concerning U.S. ship visits to New Zealand. While nuclear powered ship visits were a controversial feature of the U.S. New Zealand relationship in the early 1970's⁴, the Muldoon Government supported U.S. nuclear powered ship visits. From 1975 – 1984, nine nuclear propelled naval vessels visited New Zealand from a total of forty-two naval vessels⁵. Although the Muldoon Government supported nuclear powered ship visits, the issue remained a contentious one in the domestic politics of New Zealand.

In 1984, the Labor Party replaced Muldoon's National Party and David Lange became Prime Minister. David Lange, who in his earlier days had protested against the war in Viet Nam and New Zealand's involvement in the war⁶, sought to enforce a more specific New Zealand policy that would not allow ship visits by nuclear powered vessels. He and his party took the policy a step further by prohibiting visits by nuclear armed or nuclear capable vessels⁷. U.S. policy in this period was to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons on board U.S. vessels, and New Zealand's policy put them in contravention with the policy of their strongest ally, the United States⁸. The issue came to a head during the proposed ship visit by the USS *Buchanan*, an aged destroyer which was clearly neither nuclear powered nor nuclear armed. Because the United States would neither confirm nor deny that the *Buchanan* was nuclear capable, the Lange Government would not approve the visit. U.S. Secretary of State Schultz interpreted the New Zealand decision as preventing the U.S. from being able to fulfill treaty obligations to New Zealand because New Zealand's policy restricted the free and unconstrained navigation of U.S. military warships in New Zealand's territorial waters. The U.S. Navy sought to maintain the policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons or capability on U.S. warships. In August 1986, Secretary Schultz informed New Zealand that "we part as friends but we part company as far as the Alliance is concerned."⁹ The U.S. no longer acknowledged any treaty obligation to New Zealand, and the U.S. - New Zealand portion of the ANZUS treaty was no longer in effect.

Remarkably, David Lange and his Government went on to codify New Zealand's stance against visits by nuclear powered vessels in the 1987 *New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms control Act*¹⁰. The Act is significant because since 1991, it has been U.S. policy that U.S. Navy surface ships do not carry nuclear weapons¹¹. While this U.S. policy change conforms to New Zealand's policy of no nuclear weapons in New Zealand territorial waters, Chapter 11 of the Act continues to ban the presence of nuclear powered vessels in New

Zealand's territorial waters. The U.S. policy on this matter is that "New Zealand's legislation prohibiting visits of nuclear-powered ships continues to preclude a bilateral security alliance with the U.S."¹² The state in which New Zealand and the U.S. now find themselves is one in which a policy born of the Cold War, which was the U.S. insistence on the unimpeded access of U.S. Naval vessels, continues as a source of conflict with New Zealand's law on no nuclear powered ships in New Zealand's territorial waters. The U.S. and New Zealand continue to officially be at loggerheads on this issue.

SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. AND NEW ZEALAND MILITARY RELATIONS

The reality of the matter is that while in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. revocation of the ANZUS treaty, U.S. - New Zealand military relations were very grim, over time the relations have improved, and it is worth noting that New Zealand participated in operation DESERT STORM in 1991 by contributing forces to the Coalition¹³. However, immediately after the policy dispute in the mid - 1980's, Lieutenant Colonel Frank P. Donnini notes that there were no longer "combined training and exercises, intelligence and surveillance support, logistics and supply support, personnel exchanges, or defense conferences and consultations."¹⁴ In fact, subsequent to the "crisis years of 1984-86,"¹⁵ U.S. - New Zealand defense relations are much improved. New Zealand continues to be able to buy U.S. origin defense goods and services, whether via Direct Commercial Sale or Foreign Military Sales. Recently, New Zealand concluded a Foreign Military Sales contract with the United States to buy the Javelin anti-tank weapon system "to meet its medium range anti-armor capability."¹⁶ The New Zealand Ministry of Defense also recently announced that New Zealand selected L-3 Communications as the preferred contractor for New Zealand's fleet of P-3 Orion (P-3) aircraft (total fleet of six aircraft).¹⁷ While New Zealand does obtain defense goods and services from other countries, including Spain, Australia and Austria, the United States remains an important supplier.

The U.S. and New Zealand cooperate in other areas as well, including intelligence sharing. Admiral Fargo, the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, stated in testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, that New Zealand and the United States have an Acquisition Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and that New Zealand also participates in the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS). Admiral Fargo explained that CENTRIXS "is the effort to establish permanent, classified coalition networks between U.S. and coalition partners."¹⁸ In an analysis of the New Zealand Defense Forces, the Center for Defense Information (CDI) observed that "New Zealand's participation in the key international Navy, Army, and Air Force interoperability working groups has remained relatively

unaffected by political turmoil and has provided valuable continuity in professional military liaison.”¹⁹ These working groups include such efforts as the U.S. Pacific Command sponsored Pacific Senior Officer Logistics Seminar, or PASOLS. New Zealand also remains eligible to procure U.S. military training, absent restrictions related to New Zealand’s nuclear policy. As recently as Academic Year 2004, a New Zealand Army officer attended the U.S. Army War College. These examples serve to underscore that on many levels, U.S. and New Zealand defense cooperation continues and in some instances, flourishes. However, the mosaic is incomplete; as the CDI report notes, “events which are designated ‘exercises’ are still banned.”²⁰

EXERCISES REMAIN A CONTENTIOUS ISSUE

Clearly, the United States has softened on some of the aspects of the relationship, but the United States continues to hold one of the “Crown Jewels” of the relationship – bilateral exercises - hostage to New Zealand’s nuclear policy. That the United States does so, and without apology, is perfectly acceptable in the complex milieu of international relations. What now changes the dynamic is the Global War on Terrorism, and the need for friends and allies to cooperate and assist in areas where common interests converge. In the case of New Zealand, the advent of the Global War on Terrorism has apparently prompted some U.S. reconsideration of the complete ban on exercises. An article in the “Royal New Zealand Air Force News” from June 2004 contained the following information on an exercise with the United States and Australia:

...No. 40 Squadron [New Zealand’s C-130 squadron] is working hand in hand with the Americans this month as part of a training exercise at Little Rock Air Force base in Arkansas. It’s the first time the RNZAF has taken part in the Joint Readiness Training Centre, which also involves the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army and the Royal Australian Air Force. Two C-130’s and 79 personnel will spend two weeks in the southern state, carrying out airdrops and tactical flying. The exercise is designed to create a realistic ground based on Operation Enduring Freedom.²¹

In a September 2004 New Zealand Defense Force media release, the Defense Force reported that “Air Force Hercules Touches Down in Afghanistan,”²² complete with a picture of a Royal New Zealand Air Force C-130 at Bamian airfield in Afghanistan. The evidence of these two related events suggests that the U.S. is willing to approve New Zealand Defense Force participation in exercises when those exercises will support efforts in the Global War on Terrorism. The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy country program directors for New Zealand report that the “specifics regarding

exceptions to this policy are classified.”²³ What is significant from this anecdotal evidence is that it appears that the Global War on Terrorism has prompted at least some reconsideration of the U.S. policy on exercises.

WHY MILITARY EXERCISES ARE IMPORTANT

In general, the New Zealand Defense Force is well trained, highly regarded, and as the Center for Defense Information notes, “the New Zealand Army has great expertise, as a small army, at company level, where the individual soldier and sub-unit tactical skills are most developed. The breach in defense relations with the United States has had most effect on formation and unit training at the battalion level and above.”²⁴ It is important to have forces well trained at the tactical level, but in coalition or peacekeeping operations, where the formations are typically much larger, it is important to have forces arrive to participate that are ready to do so. Countries’ militaries, particularly if they are to respond to contingencies, must have a rigorous schedule of exercises that closely replicate anticipated conditions. It’s too late to worry about exercises, when units are in contact.

Exercises allow military units to expose gaps and seams in how they operate together. Units will find areas where uncertainty exists, and they will create tactics, techniques and procedures that will rectify these deficiencies during future operations and exercises. Furthermore, many skills, such as tactical air control, are highly perishable, and again, reasonable leaders don’t want friendly troops in contact who cannot use all weapons available to them. Exercises are an iterative process, that allows military organizations to increase their proficiency, and to prepare them for operations. The Combatant Commanders’ Theater Security Cooperation Plans are filled with exercises, precisely because they are the capstone event, where all of the training, equipment, personnel and TTP’s are brought together. Denying a nation’s military the opportunity to exercise with their partners is to unnecessarily disadvantage those formations, and to potentially adversely impact on the interests of the U.S., if the U.S. counts on those formations in the GWOT or other areas of common interest.

THE POLICY PROHIBITING EXERCISES SHOULD CHANGE

It appears that New Zealand’s participation in exercises may be approved on a case by case basis, and if that is the case, it is a flawed policy. If the U.S. is in a long term war on terrorism, then wouldn’t the U.S. want partners to be as well trained and as interoperable as possible? The answer to that question is “yes,” and exercises are key to successful interoperability and training. Furthermore, exercises by their very nature, are complex and require advance coordination and planning. When one factors in the extreme distances

involved in the Pacific (it's about 9,000 air miles from New York City to Wellington, New Zealand), distance becomes a factor as well. Instead of having exercise approval dependent upon the less than timely interagency process, and, in all honesty, New Zealand is not on the top ten list of any D.C. official, the U.S. should change the exercise policy to allow for regularly scheduled exercises on a routine basis.

In response to the time honored Army War College student question that burns away the fog of policy, "What's in it for the U.S.?" consider the following. The President sees participation of friends and allies as key to U.S. success in the Global War on Terrorism, and he acknowledges that New Zealand is a close friend in the effort. Is what New Zealand brings to the table sufficient to make the case that the U.S. should abandon one of the remaining underpinnings of the U.S. response to New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy, specifically the U.S. ban on exercises? At this point in time, it is clear that it is in the best interests of the U.S. to take that step.

U.S. AND NEW ZEALAND CONVERGENT INTERESTS

The U.S. and New Zealand are in an interesting period in our relationship in that there is now great convergence in our common interests. When one hearkens back to the bleak days of 1942, when the Japanese-led expansion threatened Australia and New Zealand, one realizes that the enduring ties between the U.S. and New Zealand were born in a time of common peril. As the U.S. Department of State notes in its country paper on New Zealand, "during the war, more than 400,000 American military personnel were stationed in New Zealand to prepare for crucial battles such as Tarawa and Guadalcanal."²⁵ The U.S. and New Zealand forged enduring links during that era of shared danger. The United States and New Zealand still share common national interests, and as Prime Minister Helen Clark stated in a speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, "with the United States and Canada, we share fundamental commitments to democratic values, open markets, and human rights."²⁶ Given our heritage as former British colonies and our history since World War II, the U.S. and New Zealand have common interests that can be seen to take precedence over the conflict with New Zealand over New Zealand's nuclear policy. There are also very practical economic interests, especially for New Zealand, where the "U.S. is [New Zealand's] second-largest bilateral trading partner and [New Zealand's] third-largest source of foreign direct investment."²⁷ The U.S. - New Zealand relationship functions within, at the national level, a tableau of very important interests.

Not surprisingly, given a somewhat similar world view, these shared interests translate to convergence at the practical level. In the Global War on Terrorism, New Zealand has been a

dedicated friend, acting in both word and deed. As Prime Minister Helen Clark explained in a speech to the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs,

...New Zealand continues to play an active role in the counter-terrorism area in the wider world. The New Zealand Special Air Service has been redeployed to Afghanistan to assist in the interdiction of Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives, and the frigate *Te Mana* is patrolling the Arabian Sea. We also support and staff a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamian, Afghanistan. As a failed state Afghanistan had become a haven for, and source of extremism. Our government believes New Zealand should play a part in preventing that happening again...²⁸

From a stylistic perspective, this speech sounds very much like President Bush, and echoes his views on the Global War on Terrorism. From an operational perspective, it is worth noting that the frigate *Te Mana* represents one third of New Zealand's surface combatants, a significant contribution by any measure. With New Zealand soldiers still in Afghanistan, it is clear that New Zealand shares a commitment to defeating terrorism.

Iraq is a different matter, but even there, where New Zealand did not support U.S. intervention²⁹, New Zealand has still made a contribution. Subsequent to the U.S. – led invasion, New Zealand sent two rotations of engineers (approximately sixty soldiers each) to work with the British in the Basra area. Prime Minister Clark recognizes the need to support the reconstruction of Iraq, and the New Zealand Government, beyond the contributions of engineers, “recently agreed to contribute an additional \$3 million for UN efforts in electoral assistance and for UNHCR to resettle returning refugees.”³⁰



FIGURE 1.³¹

Just as the U.S. has expanded its strategy to efforts in the Global War on Terrorism to beyond the immediate focus in Afghanistan and Iraq, so too has New Zealand. President Bush explained to the graduates of the U.S. Air Force Academy that the U.S. is “using all elements of national power to deny terrorists the chemical, biological and nuclear weapons they seek ... We have joined with 14 other nations in the Proliferation Security Initiative [PSI] to interdict – on sea, on land, or in the air – shipments of weapons of mass destruction, components to build those weapons, and the means to deliver them.”³² The New Zealand Government again finds itself

sharing the U.S. position. New Zealand Foreign Minister Phil Goff announced that New Zealand supports the Proliferation Security Initiative, and will contribute \$1 Million to the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.³³ In order for New Zealand to increase its participation in the PSI, the U.S. position on bilateral exercises would have to be relaxed. Many of the PSI activities center on exercises, and the U.S. Navy participated in a PSI exercise in September 2003 with Australia and Japan in the waters off of Australia.³⁴

In the waters off of Australia and in the South Pacific in general, New Zealand has been an able contributor to security efforts. Some in the Australian Army say that “New Zealand soldiers are better than Ghurkhas – you don’t have to pay them and they bring their own officers.”³⁵ This somewhat light hearted line does in many ways typify the New Zealand Army – they are tough, well-led soldiers. But as light hearted as it may be, it doesn’t diminish Australia’s view of New Zealand’s role in Pacific security. As part of the Joint Statement on Closer Defense Relations between New Zealand and Australia, the two countries stated that “there is no strategic partnership in our region closer than that between Australia and New Zealand.”³⁶ New Zealand sent forces (approximately one battalion) to support the Australian led effort in East Timor, and New Zealand sent forces (approximately one company and aviation assets) to the Australian led effort in the Solomon Islands. New Zealand willingly participates in security operations in the region, no doubt motivated by their own interests in maintaining a benign environment in the region. What is important from the U.S. perspective is that stability in the Pacific is important. The U.S. does not have the resources to patrol all four corners of the globe, and, as in the Global War on Terrorism, must work with other nations to maintain stability and encourage democratic values. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Matt Daley captured the U.S. view of security in the Pacific during an address at Georgetown University in February 2004. There, he stated that,

...each country in the region, and that includes the U.S., is mutually dependent upon the others for achieving its essential security needs. This follows from the interconnectedness of the U.S. and the Pacific island region. Ships and planes are constantly moving goods and peoples into and out of our harbors and airports. Less visibly, money, information, and communications are being exchanged as well. While all these movements are essential to our well-being, they also feature an element of risk: that they might be exploited by people who wish to do us harm. Managing that risk responsibly, while still facilitating the free movement of people, goods, and information, are a mutual obligation for everyone involved...³⁷

For the United States, the Pacific has always been an economy of force mission, and efforts to maintain stability in the Pacific are no exception today. The U.S. depends on

Australia and New Zealand to “do the heavy lifting” in terms of security in the Pacific. These efforts no doubt benefit Australia and New Zealand, but as Matt Dailey implies they benefit the U.S. as well.

New Zealand and Australia also are quick to respond to natural disasters as well, and during the recent Tsunami that struck Southeast Asia, both nations took action to relieve suffering and assist survivors. As the photos below demonstrate, New Zealand is contributing relief forces to work with Australian forces in Indonesia. While New Zealand’s contribution is small, relative to the U.S. and Australia (a 30 person medical detachment and a C-130), it nevertheless underscores New Zealand’s willingness to do something to assist those in distress. When taken in the context of New Zealand’s contributions in East Timor, the Solomon Islands, and New Zealand’s ongoing efforts in the Pacific Islands, it is clear that New Zealand is a ready and willing partner.

When examined in detail, the security environment in the world today has clearly moved the U.S. and New Zealand to a point where there are many more shared national interests than differences. The remaining issue that should be examined is New Zealand’s capacity in the next five to ten years to continue to contribute, as least militarily, to the Global War on Terrorism and to security interests in general.



FIGURE 2. ³⁸

NEW ZEALAND’S DEFENSE FORCE MODERNIZATION

New Zealand is in the third year of a ten year modernization program described in their Long Term Development Plan, or LTDP.³⁹ Prime Minister Clark’s administration put the LTDP into effect because when her Government took office in 1999, it “inherited a Defence Force suffering from nine years of neglect ... [New Zealand] had the Army, Navy, and Air Force actively competing against each other for extremely limited funding, equipment dating from the 1960s, pay rates that lagged



FIGURE 3. ⁴⁰

well behind the market, and no resources or acquisitions planned for the future. [The Government] had to step back and re-evaluate how best to meet our objectives.”⁴¹ The LTDP was first released in 2002 and it is a blue print for the acquisitions necessary for modernizing the New Zealand Defense Forces.⁴² The Government committed an objective of \$1 billion New Zealand dollars to fund the project for a ten year period, and it is very ambitious.⁴³ The New Zealand Minister of Defense, Mr. Mark Burton, notes that the plan is moving forward, and new aircraft, such as two of Boeing’s 757, and the New Zealand Light Armor Vehicles are now fielded. Other programs, such as Project Protector, which includes seven new vessels for the Royal New Zealand Navy, are funded and under contract. A program to replace New Zealand’s utility helicopter fleet is well underway, and should enter the acquisition phase in 2005. What is important, for the purposes of this paper, is that New Zealand does have a plan to modernize their forces and build them into a capable multinational partner for the next twenty years. It is important to note that this capability includes maritime, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief capability. While New Zealand’s focus is not at the high end of conflict, New Zealand will retain a potent direct action capability with the New Zealand Special Air Service. New Zealand’s focus matches PACOM’s most likely crisis response scenario and compliments the high-end capability that the U.S. and Australia bring to the ANZUS alliance.

RELEVANCE OF THE NEW ZEALAND DEFENSE FORCE

If the U.S. were to change its policy on exercises towards New Zealand, the New Zealand Defense Forces would still be relevant and able to participate in coalition operations. Certainly, the New Zealand Defense Forces would be able to perform security missions, such as reconstruction and stabilization missions, both in the Pacific and in the world at large. In fact, the new Multi Role Vessel, which is one of the seven vessels which constitute Project Protector, “will be used in the South Pacific and Asia-Pacific region for contributing to peace support operations [such as East Timor and the Solomon Islands], evacuation of personnel during civil emergencies, and disaster relief [such as the Tsunami relief effort].”⁴⁴ New Zealand will have the wherewithal to continue to be a capable friend in the future. If the U.S. hopes to maximize the potential of that friendship, the U.S. should rescind the policy of no exercises to ensure that the New Zealand Defense Force is consistently well trained to participate in U.S. led coalitions, PSI activities, Pacific security missions and other missions as they may arise. Failure to do so would reflect a lack of vision to adjust an antebellum policy to the conditions that pertain today.

Now, in October 2004, the United States looks forward with concern about an optimum strategy to execute the Global War on Terrorism, and what new dangers lie ahead. However,

as Americans look forward, they should also do so with a sense of optimism. The United States has weathered 9/11, and has taken action and made progress in Afghanistan and in Iraq. In both operations, and in particular in Afghanistan, loyal friends and allies stand with the United States against terrorism. Even with the ambiguous feelings that our current administration has engendered, Americans should be proud that we are still able to rally such support. In the case of New Zealand, the U.S. is now in a period where similar goals and interests between the U.S. and New Zealand are more common than are differences. No one can predict how long the Global War on Terrorism will last, and yet New Zealand stands with us.

THE FUTURE: RESTORATION OF THE U.S. – NEW ZEALAND PORTION OF THE ANZUS TREATY?

Does this relatively recent convergence in security policy foreshadow a dramatic return to the ANZUS alliance? I do not believe so, certainly not until New Zealand overturns the law banning nuclear powered vessels from its territorial waters. The U.S. Navy continues to center much of its combat power on nuclear powered vessels, such as aircraft carriers and submarines. These vessels are proven safe, and there is no health or security reason for not allowing them to enter New Zealand territorial waters. Until such time as New Zealand changes the law precluding U.S. nuclear powered warships from entering New Zealand territorial waters, the U.S. commitment to the New Zealand portion of the the ANZUS Treaty will remain suspended. Perhaps in New Zealand's 2005 election, the New Zealand National Party will return to power, and such a change may occur. It is also possible that Prime Minister Clark, who has shown herself to be a pragmatic and forceful leader, will seek to attenuate or overturn New Zealand's anti-nuclear legislation. The events of 9/11 changed much in the world, and New Zealand, linked for its economic survival to the global economy, is vulnerable to isolation and disruption. Prime Minister Clark may find that the events of 9/11 have superseded New Zealand's stance on nuclear ships, and that it is now time for New Zealand to ally more closely with the United States. Whatever the results of the election, for the present, the U.S. and New Zealand find themselves on the same side of many issues, and New Zealand is a valued friend in the GWOT. Therefore, the U.S. should lift the ban on military exercises.

As U.S. and New Zealand forces work together around the globe in common cause, the U.S. should put in place exercises to facilitate our forces working together seamlessly, if for no other reason than to give the soldiers, sailors and airmen working side by side a better chance for success. New Zealand wants exercises with the U.S., as evidenced by its participation in the exercise in Arkansas, and the men and women of the New Zealand Defense Force use the experience gained in these multinational exercises to improve their readiness and

interoperability as they have successfully done in Afghanistan. The U.S. also seeks to increase the efficacy of the PSI, and, as exercises are the cornerstone of successfully implementing the program in the Pacific, the U.S. should invite New Zealand's highly regarded Navy to participate. New Zealand's participation in the Global War on Terrorism will not, in and of itself, turn the tide to the advantage of civilized nations. However, the cooperation and resilience of civilized nations together will bring about success in the Global War on Terrorism. In Asia and in the Pacific, New Zealand has repeatedly demonstrated a commitment to take action in support of common causes, most recently to assist the victims of the Tsunami. The United States should seek to work more closely with New Zealand, as both nations fight together to defeat terrorism and pursue other common national security interests. The U.S. and New Zealand have close economic, social, and historical ties that, at this important point in our histories, should lessen the impact of our differences.

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ENDNOTES

¹ For the purposes of this paper, I shall define an ally as a nation that is legally bound to another nation's security, through a treaty. In other words, an ally of the United States is a country with whom the U.S. shares a treaty relationship. A friend is a nation that is kindly disposed towards U.S. objectives. In this paper, New Zealand is no longer an ally, as the U.S. suspended the Australia, New Zealand, U.S. (ANZUS) treaty portion between the U.S. and New Zealand. New Zealand is a friend, and Australia remains an ally.

² George Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 7.

³ Ibid., 26.

⁴ New Zealand National Party Task Force, "The Relationship Between New Zealand and the United States," May 2004, 35; available from <[http://www.national.org.nz/files/2004%20-%20US-NZ%20Taskforce%20-%20Final%20-%20\(3%20May%2004\)1.pdf](http://www.national.org.nz/files/2004%20-%20US-NZ%20Taskforce%20-%20Final%20-%20(3%20May%2004)1.pdf)>; Internet; accessed 29 September 2004.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Frank P. Donnini, *ANZUS IN REVISION; Changing Defense Features of Australia and New Zealand in the Mid-1980s* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL; Air University Press, 1991), 108; available from <http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/Books/Donnini/donnini.pdf>; Internet; accessed 29 September 2004.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Andrew C. Jampoler, "The Politics of Port Visits," *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute*, Vol. 130/8/1,216 (August 2004):67.

⁹ Donnini, 111.

¹⁰ National Party Task Force, 37.

¹¹ U.S. Department of State, *Background Note: New Zealand* (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Department of State, 2004), 8; available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35852.htm>; Internet; accessed 28 September 2004.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Andrew Scobell, "Strategic Effects of the Conflict with Iraq: Australia and New Zealand," (Carlisle Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, March 2003), 6; available from <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdf/PUB56.pdf>; Internet; accessed 8 October 2004.

¹⁴ Donnini, 113.

¹⁵ Colin Robinson, "The Transformation of an Ally? Present Status and Future Projects for the New Zealand Defense Forces," 23 January 2002; available from <http://www.cdi.org/mrp/new-zealand-pr.cfm>; Internet; accessed 21 Sep 2004.

¹⁶ Raytheon News Release, "New Zealand Selects Raytheon-Lockheed Martin Javelin anti-tank Weapon System," 30 January 2003; available from http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/micro_stories.pl?ACCT=148607&TICK=RTNB2&STORY=/www/story/01-30-2003/0001882024&EDATE=Jan+30,+2003; Internet; accessed 29 Sep 2004.

¹⁷ L-3 Communications News Release, "L-3 Communications Selected by New Zealand Ministry of Defence as preferred Contractor on P-3 Orion Patrol Fleet Upgrade," 19 August 2004; available from <http://www.businesswire.com/webbox/bw.081904/242325449.htm>; Internet; accessed 2 October 2004.

¹⁸ Thomas B. Fargo, "Testimony of Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, United States Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command Before the House Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives, Regarding U.S. Pacific Command Posture," 31 March 2004; available from <http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2004/040331housearmedsvcscomm.shtml>; Internet; accessed 2 October 2004.

¹⁹ Robinson, 5.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ "No. 40 Squadron U.S. Bound," Royal New Zealand Air Force News (June 2004), 8RNZAF News, p. 8.

²² New Zealand Defence Force, "Air Force Hercules Touches Down in Afghanistan," 10 September 2004; available from <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/news/articles/2004/09/0910-afh.html>; Internet; accessed 29 September 2004.

²³ Peter Ipsen <Peter.Ipsen@osd.mil>, "Re: US Policy towards New Zealand," electronic message to Brandon Denecke brandon.denecke@us.army.mil, 21 September 2004.

²⁴ Robinson, 3.

²⁵ Department of State, 8.

²⁶ Helen Clark, "Address to the NZ Institute of International Affairs," 23 June 2004; available from <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/printDocument.cfm?DocumentID=20104>; Internet; accessed 29 September 2004, 6.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., 2.

²⁹ Scobell, 4.

³⁰ Clark, 3.

³¹ New Zealand Defence Force, "Winter Woolies Distributed in Afghanistan," 26 November 2004; available from <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/news/articles/2004/11/1126.html>; Internet; accessed 22 January 2005.

³² George Bush, "Remarks by the President at the United States Air Force Academy Graduation," 2 June 2004, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/print/20040602.html>; Internet; accessed 29 September 2004.

³³ Marian Hobbs, "Further NZ Contribution to Disarmament," 01 June 2004; available from <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/printDocument.cfm?DocumentID=19917>; Internet; accessed 16 September 2004, 1.

³⁴ Robert Hill, "Media Conference for PSI Exercise," 13 September 2004; available from <http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2003/140903.doc>; Internet; accessed 29 September 2004.

³⁵ Graeme Dobell, "Correspondents Report – 20th Anniversary of NZ/US Split," 27 June 2004; available from <http://www.abc.net.au/correspondents/content/2004/s1140780.htm>; Internet; accessed 21 September 2004.

³⁶ Mark Burton, "New Closer Defence Relations Statement Released," 26 June 2003; available from <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/PrintDocument.cfm?DocumentID=17174>; Internet; accessed 21 September 2004.

³⁷ Matthew P. Daley, "United States Policy Toward the Pacific Islands," *DISAM Journal* 26:3 (Spring 2004): 95.

³⁸ New Zealand Defence Force, "The Strength of the ANZAC Spirit," 21 January 2005; available from <http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/news/articles/2005/01/0121-as.html>; Internet; accessed 22 January 2005.

³⁹ New Zealand Defence Force, *2004 Statement of Intent for the Year Ending 30 June 2005*, Wellington, N.Z.: New Zealand Defence Force, May 2004, 7.

⁴⁰ Australian Government, Department of Defence, "Imagery from Operation Sumatra Assist," 16 January 2005; available from <http://www.defence.gov.au/optsunamiassist/images/gallery/160105a/index.htm>; Internet; accessed 22 January 2005.

⁴¹ Mark Burton, "New Zealand Defence: Playing our part as a responsible world citizen," 12 November 2004; available from <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/printDocument.cfm?DocumentID=21463>; Internet; accessed 22 January 2005, 3.

⁴² New Zealand Defence Force, *Defence Long Term Development Plan, Update June 2003*, Wellington, N.Z.: New Zealand Defence Force, June 2003, 3.

⁴³ New Zealand Defence Force, *Defence Long Term Development Plan, Update November 2004*, Wellington, N.Z.: New Zealand Defence Force, November 2004, 7.

⁴⁴ *2004 Statement of Intent*, 15.

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